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ABSTRACT
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court
held that corporate political speech could not be regulated on the basis of corporate status alone. In
support of that conclusion, the majority characterized corporations as mere “associations of
citizens.” The dissent, meanwhile, viewed corporations as state-created entities that “differ from
natural persons in fundamental ways” and “have been ‘effectively delegated responsibility for
ensuring society’s economic welfare.’” I have previously argued that these two competing
conceptions of the corporation implicate corporate theory, with the majority adopting an
aggregate/contractarian view, and the dissent an artificial entity/concession view. Even if one
understands Citizens United to be primarily about listeners’ rights, this stark contrast of
competing theories of the corporation is difficult to ignore. At the very least, what the majority and
dissent thought about corporate speakers was relevant to deciding whether the campaign finance
restrictions challenged in Citizens United should fall within that narrow class of speech
restrictions justified on the basis of the speaker’s identity due to “an interest in allowing
governmental entities to perform their functions.” Somewhat surprisingly, however, the majority
was silent, and the dissent expressly disavowed, any role for corporate theory. I have also
previously offered some explanations for this apparent inconsistency, and concluded that an active
“silent corporate theory debate” was indeed integral to the outcome of Citizens United—despite
protestations to the contrary. In this Article, I examine the key Supreme Court cases leading up to
Citizens United to see whether a similar silent corporate theory debate is evident in those cases. I
find that there is indeed such an on-going debate, and proceed to argue that in future cases
involving the rights of corporations, the Justices should make their views regarding the proper
theory of the corporation express. This will allow for a more meaningful discussion of the merits of
those decisions, and impose an additional layer of intellectual accountability on the jurists.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a 5-4 majority of the
Supreme Court ruled that corporate political speech could not be regulated
1
on the basis of corporate status alone. Given that there is a great deal of
debate about what corporations are (corporations have to date eluded
capture), one would think that the Court would have needed to answer that
question first before reaching its conclusion. However, the majority was
silent on this issue and the dissent went so far as to expressly disavow any
2
role for corporate theory at all. Instead, the opinion appeared to rest on a
3
“listeners’ rights” analysis. It remains unclear, however, how focusing on

1
2

3

130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (“[T]he Government may not suppress political speech on the
basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”).
Id. at 971 n.72 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“Nothing in this
analysis turns on whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state
concession, . . . a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, . . . a mediated hierarchy of
stakeholders, . . . or any other recognized model.” (internal citations omitted)).
See Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1019, 1052–53 (2011) (discussing implications of a listeners’ rights rationale of Citizens
United). But see First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 828 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (“It is true . . . that recent decisions of this Court have emphasized the interest
of the public in receiving the information offered by the speaker seeking protection. The
free flow of information is in no way diminished by the Commonwealth’s decision to
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listeners’ rights could eliminate all need to examine the nature of
4
corporations. For example, how would one know whether corporations fit
within the well-established line of identity-based exception cases under the
First Amendment without addressing the unique aspects of corporate
5
identity? As I have previously noted:
[The fact that] corporations could pursue goals that no individual living
human being desired (and that might in fact be harmful to human
beings) because the relevant decision-makers were legally required to
follow the dictates of a fictional shareholder, could implicate the
question of whether corporations should fall within that narrow class of
speech restrictions justified on the basis of identity due to “an interest in
6
allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.”

The Court in Citizens United simply rejected any such contention by baldly
asserting that: “The corporate independent expenditures at issue in this
7
case, however, would not interfere with governmental functions.”
Despite protestations to the contrary, however, a closer reading of the
Citizens United opinion reveals that both the majority and dissent not only
adopted diverging theories of the corporation, but that those theories were
likely dispositive. I have previously set forth my arguments in support of this

4

5
6

7

permit the operation of business corporations with limited rights of political expression.
All natural persons, who owe their existence to a higher sovereign than the
Commonwealth, remain as free as before to engage in political activity.”). Cf. TAMARA R.
PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 18
(2012) (noting that Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (creating the commercial speech doctrine), “was also novel
because it focused on the listeners’ (consumers’) rights to hear rather than on the
speakers’ (pharmacies’) right to speak”).
Cf. Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate
Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 511 (2011) (“The [Massachusetts Citizens For Life] Court, however, used the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor as a general
justification to restrict corporate speech, not as a means to strike down the regulation for
the benefit of the citizen-listeners as it had in past cases.” (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) (“This concern over the corrosive
influence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to
protect the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas.”))).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899 (“The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech
restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons . . . .”).
Stefan J. Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation: More Than a Nexus-Of-Contracts, 114 W. VA.
L. REV. 209, 227–28 (2011) (footnote omitted) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899)
[hereinafter Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation]. See also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“Perhaps the officers or directors
of the corporation have the best claim to be the ones speaking, except their fiduciary
duties generally prohibit them from using corporate funds for personal ends. . . . It is
entirely possible that the corporation’s electoral message will conflict with their personal
convictions.”); Tucker, supra note 4, at 536 (“A second, broader criticism of the Court’s
assumptions regarding the singular corporate voice and freedom of association is that
corporate speech does not reflect the view of any citizen-shareholder . . . .”).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899.
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proposition elsewhere, and will repeat them here to the extent necessary in
8
Part III.A. Obviously, understanding the Court to have based its decision
on a “covert” application of corporate theory raises a number of interesting
questions. First, why not simply engage in this analysis overtly? Second, if
the Court engaged in a silent corporate theory analysis in Citizens United, was
that the first time it had done so or is this part of some larger trend? Finally,
how should we respond to this practice, if in fact it is one? I will attempt to
answer these questions in this Article.
Following this Introduction, I will set forth a brief overview of the
relevant theories of the corporation. In Part III, I will examine the role of
corporate theory in some of the Supreme Court’s most important campaign
finance cases. First, in Part III.A, I will explain how corporate theory was
dispositive in Citizens United. Next, in Part III.B, I will examine the key
Supreme Court cases leading up to Citizens United. I will argue that
corporate theory played the same silent and dispositive role in many of those
cases as it did in Citizens United.
In Part IV, I will discuss the implications of my conclusions. Ultimately, I
will argue that the Justices of the Supreme Court should make express their
views about what constitutes the best theory of the corporation. This will
allow for better analysis and criticism of the Court’s opinions in this area.
While there remains some possibility that this practice would not alter the
ultimate results in at least some of these cases, it is difficult to argue that the
increased transparency and accountability would be a bad thing.
Furthermore, as I will strive to make clear in the pages that follow, as
between the two primary theories of the corporation, one essentially
precludes the possibility of reaching Citizens United’s conclusion that political
speech rights may not be regulated on the basis of corporate status alone,
and the other is practically necessary to reach that result. In light of this, the
Court’s failure to discuss corporate theory in Citizens United (beyond Justice
Stevens’ unconvincing attempt to sweep the issue aside in a footnote)
constitutes a material omission that should be corrected in future opinions

8

This Article extends my previous work on Citizens United and the theory of the
corporation. See Stefan J. Padfield, Citizens United and the Nexus-of-Contracts Presumption, 1
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 25, 26 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/2011/01/citizens-unitedand-the-nexus-of-contracts-presumption/ [hereinafter Padfield, Citizens United and the
Nexus-of-Contracts Presumption] (arguing that the competing visions of the corporation
advanced by the majority and dissent in Citizens United roughly aligned with two divergent
theories of the corporation—“nexus-of-contracts theory for the majority and concession
theory for the dissent”); Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6 (arguing that
Dodd-Frank’s official recognition of the too-big-to-fail corporation undermined the
majority’s opinion in Citizens United because that opinion rested on a theory of the
corporation that espouses a worldview wherein deregulated markets lead to an efficient
allocation of assets, not global crisis).
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addressing the role of corporations in society. Nonetheless, I do address
some potential criticisms of my proposal in Part V. Finally, I provide
concluding remarks in Part VI.

II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION
Robert Hamilton and Richard Booth identify the primary theories of the
corporation as: (1) entity theory; (2) concession theory; (3) contract theory;
(4) nexus-of-contracts theory (also known as contractarianism); and,
9
(5) “process” theory. As I will explain in more detail below, Hamilton’s and
Booth’s process theory can be understood to capture both the director10
primacy and team-production theories of the corporation.
One should
also understand that concession theory and “artificial entity” theory are
essentially synonymous, as are nexus-of-contracts theory and “aggregate”
theory. Finally, I will also argue that director-primacy/team-production
11
theory and “real entity” theory are synonymous. Because this may all be a
bit overwhelming for the uninitiated, I offer the following table for
assistance. The reader should take comfort in knowing that at the end of
this section we will predominantly be focusing on only two of these theories:
concession and nexus-of-contracts.

9
10

11

ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BLACK LETTER OUTLINES: CORPORATIONS
327–32 (5th ed. 2006) (detailing the various theories of corporation law).
See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (describing the director primacy model as it
relates to various aspects of corporation law); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (arguing for a mediating
hierarchy model as a solution to problems inherent in public corporations).
As will be discussed in more detail below, both my alignment of director-primacy/teamproduction with real entity theory, and my conclusion that real entity theory had less of a
role to play in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), than the
contractarianism and concession theory, are at least somewhat controversial.
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THEORY OF THE
CORPORATION

ALTERNATIVE
DESIGNATION

No.

The corporation is a
creature of the state
intended to benefit
society as a whole.

Yes. The theory posits
that the state has wide
latitude in regulating
its creation.

The corporate charter represents a contract between the
state and incorporators.

No.

Aggregate

The corporation is a
creature of private
contracting.

Yes. The theory posits
that the state merely
provides default rules
to facilitate private
ordering.

Real (Natural) Entity12

The corporate locus
of control resides in
the board of directors, which focuses
on coordinating the
interests of all
stakeholders.

Perhaps, but arguably
less so than contractarianism and concession theory.

Artificial
Entity

Contract

Nexus-of-contracts
(Contractarianism)

Director-primacy &
Team Production
(Process)

RELEVANT TO
OUTCOME IN CITIZENS
UNITED?

The corporation is a
separate legal entity
that can, for example, sue and be
sued.

Entity

Concession

BRIEF DESCRIPTION

[Vol. 15:3

I will first briefly review entity theory, contract theory, and process theory
(including director-primacy and team-production theory), before moving on
to a more detailed overview of concession theory and nexus-of-contracts

12

See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate
Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 914 n.174 (2011) (“The real entity theory is
also known as the natural entity theory.”).
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theory. I do this because I believe the entity, contract, and process theories
have more limited roles to play in terms of their influence on the campaign
finance cases I discuss herein, while the concession and nexus-of-contracts
13
theories represent the two “preeminent” theories of the corporation.

A. The Entity, Contract, and Process Theories of the Corporation
Entity theory simply posits that the corporation is indeed a separate legal
entity capable, for example, of being sued and filing suit against others in its
14
own name.
This is to be contrasted with businesses operating in the
general partnership form where, at least traditionally, the partnership was
15
viewed as nothing more than an aggregation of the individual owners.
Indeed, it is the fact that the corporation stands as a separate legal entity
between the owners and third parties that provides at least part of the
16
justification for bestowing limited liability upon the owners. As compared
to concession theory and nexus-of-contracts theory, however, the fact that
the corporation is deemed a legal entity with the right to sue and be sued
tells us little about where to draw the line on the state’s authority to regulate
corporations.
Contract theory, meanwhile, provides that “the charter of a corporation
represents a contract (a) between the state and the corporation, or
(b) between the corporation and its stockholders, or (c) among the
17
stockholders.” This theory was most famously relied upon by the Supreme
Court in its Dartmouth College decision, wherein the Court held that the State
of New Hampshire would violate the Contracts Clause of the United States
Constitution if it unilaterally amended the charter of Dartmouth College

13

14

15

16

17

Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personality of the
Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 201 (2006) (describing contractarianism and
concession theory as “the two preeminent theories of the corporation”).
HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 9, at 327–28 (“A corporation may be most readily
envisioned as an entity created for the purpose of conducting a business. . . . The entity
has the power to . . . bring[] suits or be[] sued . . . .”).
Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State, 2010 UTAH L.
REV. 47, 55–56 (2010) (“Because corporations are legal entities, the circumstances in
which the law will look past the corporation to its individual owners and managers are
limited. Because partnerships are not legal entities, however, the situation is reversed:
the circumstances in which the law will look to the partnership as an entity, rather than to
its owners and managers, are limited.” (footnote omitted)).
Thomas C. Folsom, Evaluating Supernatural Law: An Inquiry into the Health of Nations (The
Restatement of the Obvious, Part II), 21 REGENT U. L. REV. 105, 148 (2008) (“Limited liability
entities are based on the moral intuition of nonagency because there is separation of
ownership from control.”).
HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 9, at 329.
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without having reserved the right to do so in the original corporate
18
charter. It is in this opinion that Justice Marshall also famously stated:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it,
either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as
are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was
created. . . . The objects for which a corporation is created are universally
such as the government wishes to promote. They are deemed beneficial
to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration, and, in
19
most cases, the sole consideration of the grant.

The theory now serves primarily as the justification for the ubiquity of
20
reservation clauses in state corporate codes. It should also be noted here,
and will be discussed in more detail below, that in addition to serving as the
flagship opinion for the contract theory of the corporation, the preceding
quoted language from Justice Marshall has also been further claimed
21
primarily by concession theorists.
Process theory, meanwhile, views the corporation as “a process by which
various inputs of capital, services, and raw materials are combined to
22
produce desirable products.” As alluded to previously, for purposes of this
Article, I am equating process theory with both the director-primacy and
team-production theories of the corporation. As I have written elsewhere:
[I]t appears clear that director primacy and team production theory
differ in terms of what they view as the goal of corporate governance.
For director primacy, it is shareholder wealth maximization. For team
production theory, it is the maximization of “the joint welfare of all the

18

19
20

21

22

Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 650 (1819) (“The opinion of the
Court, after mature deliberation, is, that this [charter] is a contract, the obligation of
which cannot be impaired, without violating the constitution of the United States.”).
Id. at 636–37.
See Ian S. Speir, Constitutional and Statutory Reservation Clauses and Constitutional
Requirements of General Laws With Respect to Corporations: The Fifty States and the District of
Columbia 1 (Apr. 24, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1820868 (“Reservation
clauses, reserving to the legislature a power to amend or repeal corporate charters, are
included in the constitutions or corporation statutes of 49 states and the District of
Columbia.”). Cf. Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 69 (1992) (“Advocates of Contract Clause protection
for shareholders are aware of the ‘reserve’ clauses resulting from Dartmouth College, but
they appear to underestimate the full import of these powers. States have ‘reserved’ the
freedom . . . to ‘impair’ the rights of shareholders . . . .”).
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 n.72 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Dartmouth College as an example of
concession theory).
HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 9, at 332.
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firm’s stakeholders.”
However, both theories locate the ultimate
23
decision-making power in the board of directors . . . .

It is precisely because both theories “locate the ultimate decision-making
power in the board of directors” that I am equating them with Hamilton’s
24
and Booth’s process theory. That is to say, the board mediates the process.
Both team-production and director-primacy have been linked to
contractarianism. For example, J.W. Verret has noted that:
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production model . . . relies on
contractarian thinking . . . . In part the team production theory rests on a
conception of the institution of corporate law as a solution for limitations
in the ability of corporate constituencies to contract with each other . . . .
[Instead,] the constituencies opt into their “mediating hierarchy” of the
25
board of directors . . . .

Meanwhile, Stephen Bainbridge, “the leading proponent of the director
26
primacy view,” also clearly aligns director-primacy with the nexus-of27
contracts view. Nonetheless, the reason why I believe the director-primacy
and team-production theories should take a back-seat to concession theory
and nexus-of-contracts theory in our discussion here is because even if those
theories capture the current state of power allocation within the
corporation, the question remains whether this state of affairs is a result of
28
the market contracting for it or the state deeming it so. In other words, the
more fundamental debate between contractarianism (market decides) and
concession theory (state decides) remains regardless of what we conclude
about the relevant validity of the director-primacy and team-production
theories. Furthermore, even if both the team-production and director-

23

Stefan

Padfield,

Director-Primacy and Team-Production as Real Entity Theories,
(June 3, 2012), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/
home/director-primacy-and-team-production-as-real-entity-theories.html.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 10, at 250–51 (1999) (“In essence, the mediating hierarchy
solution requires team members to give up important rights . . . to a legal entity created
by the act of incorporation. . . . Within the corporation, control over . . . assets is
exercised by an internal hierarchy . . . . At the peak of this hierarchy sits a board of
directors . . . .”).
J.W. Verret, Treasury, Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J.
ON REG. 283, 321–22 (2010) (footnotes omitted). See also id. at 317 (“The contractarian
model is in many ways a precursor to . . . the director primacy model.”).
Id. at 321.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1,
25 (2002) (“If the corporation has a nexus, however, where is it located? The Delaware
code, like the corporate law of every other state, gives us a clear answer: the corporation’s
‘business and affairs . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors.’ Put simply, the board is the nexus.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001))).
See Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 216 (“[P]recisely because the
board of directors’ power comes from the state, [director-primacy] could also be viewed
as supporting a concession theory view of the corporation.” (footnote omitted)).

THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG

24

25

26
27

28
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primacy theories do indeed trace their roots back to contractarianism, it still
arguably makes more sense to focus on the more fundamental theory of
contractarianism (and its conventional sparring partner: concession theory)
29
before analyzing its various offspring.
Thus, while all the theories of the corporation described above can be
useful, for purposes of this Article I will be focusing on the competing
theories of nexus-of-contracts and concession. As Liam O’Melinn has noted,
while “[n]ot all theorists use the language of contract and concession,” the
two “preeminent” theories of the corporation are the nexus-of-contracts
30
theory and concession theory.

B. Concession and Nexus-of-Contracts Theory
Hamilton and Booth describe concession theory simply as the theory
31
“that a corporation is a grant or concession from the state.” Meanwhile,
they describe nexus-of-contracts theory as follows:
Economists have developed a theory of corporateness that permits
analysis of the corporation as an economic phenomenon. This theory
rejects the notion that the stockholders are the ultimate owners of the
enterprise but treats them, along with bondholders and other creditors,
as providers of capital in anticipation of receiving a desired return. The
nexus of contracts theory assumes that corporate managers obtain the
requirements of the corporation for capital, labor, materials, and services
32
through a series of contractual relationships.
29

30
31
32

To some extent, this may all be unnecessary hair-splitting because, as I will attempt to
show below, the difference between real-entity theory (where I ultimately locate the teamproduction and director-primacy theories) and contractarianism is potentially
inconsequential in terms of the pro-regulatory/anti-regulatory debate because both realentity theory and contractarianism are typically used to justify deregulation in modern
discourse.
See supra note 13, at 201 & n.3. See also id. at 258 (discussing “concession theory
and . . . its nexus of contracts counterpart”).
HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 9, at 328.
Id. at 330. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999) (describing the history
and limitations of the nexus of contracts conception).
In 1976 Michael Jensen and William Meckling first formulated the conception that
the corporation is a nexus of contracts . . . . Since that time, the conception has
dominated the law-and-economics literature in corporate law. . . . [T]he
intellectual history of . . . Jensen and Meckling . . . begins with Ronald
Coase[] . . . [who] characterized the boundaries of the firm as the range of
exchanges over which the market system was superseded and resource allocation
was accomplished instead by authority and direction. . . . Armen Alchian and
Harold Demsetz objected to the Coasian conception of the firm, and emphasized
instead the role of team production within the firm and the role of agreement and
monitoring in team production. . . . Jensen and Meckling applauded Alchian and
Demsetz’s objection to Coase’s theory of the firm, but concluded that Alchian and
Demsetz had not gone far enough in rejecting Coase . . . . Jensen and Meckling
therefore substituted, for Coase’s conception of the firm, the competing
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In differentiating these two theories, it may be helpful to refer to what David
Millon describes as the three “dimensions” along which corporate theory has
evolved: (1) the corporation as a separate entity versus “a mere aggregation
of natural individuals without a separate existence”; (2) the corporation as
an “artificial creation of state law” versus a “natural product of private
33
initiative”; and (3) the corporation as a public versus a private construct.
One may then align concession theory with a view of the corporation as a
distinct, separate entity that is a creature of state law serving an ultimately
public function, while nexus-of-contracts theory lines up with a view of the
corporation as a mere aggregation of natural individuals that is a product of
private initiative serving a predominantly private function. One of the key
distinctions flowing from all of this is that concession theory tends to
support giving the state greater authority to regulate, while nexus-ofcontracts theory espouses private ordering. Returning to Hamilton and
Booth:
According to the nexus of contracts model, it follows that the state
should not—and indeed possibly may not—prescribe mandatory rules
for corporations by statute that are inconsistent with the express or
implicit contracts. The role of corporation statutes, according to this
theory, is to provide standardized rules that most corporations will adopt,
thereby providing savings for corporations that do not need to incur the
34
cost of independently drafting such provisions.

Some have suggested that concession theory is no longer viable because
it is inexorably tied to a time in history when corporate status was bestowed
by the states on a case-by-case basis via a special charter system. For
example, Henry Butler and Larry Ribstein have written that “[concession]
theory had its origin in the early history of the corporation, when
corporations were, in fact, created by special charter. The theory has no
relevance today, when corporations are freely formed by making a simple
35
filing under general corporation laws.” However, I believe Grant Hayden

33
34
35

conception that the firm was a nexus of contracts—and, more particularly, “that
most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting
relationships among individuals . . . .”
Id. at 819–22 (internal footnotes omitted) (quoting Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976)) (citing R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386
(1937); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972)).
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 201 (1990).
HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 9, at 330–31.
HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION, at ix
(1995). Larry Ribstein unfortunately and prematurely passed away on December 24,
2011. His impact on the legal academy cannot be overstated. For a truly moving
collection of remembrances, visit: Geoffrey Manne, Larry Ribstein, RIP, TRUTH ON THE
MARKET (Dec. 24, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/12/24/larry-ribstein-rip/.
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and Matthew Bodie espouse the better view when they note that: “One
cannot contract to form a corporation. . . . The fact that th[e] permission
[to incorporate] is readily granted . . . does not change the fact that
36
permission is required.” As I have written elsewhere:
[Add together] the ubiquity of reserve clauses in corporate codes, the
existence of stakeholder statutes, and relatively recent judicial
pronouncements that “[c]orporations are creatures of the
Legislature . . . [i]t is appropriate, therefore, that the terms and
conditions of their existence be determined by that body,” and I would
go so far as to label the argument that concession theory is necessarily
37
tied to our special charter era a straw man.

Ultimately, anyone who feels compelled to tie the phrase “concession
theory” to our special charter era should feel free to replace it herein with
38
something more generic, like “the state-conferred benefits argument.”
Finally, and as already alluded to above, it is important to note that
constitutional law scholars have tended to use a slightly different lexicon
when discussing the role of corporate theory in the Supreme Court’s case
law. As Reuven Avi-Yonah describes it:
Th[e] theories are the aggregate theory, which views the corporation as an
aggregate of its members or shareholders; the artificial entity theory, which
views the corporation as a creature of the State; and the real entity theory,
which views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners nor an
extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its
39
managers.

36

37

38

39

For myself, I noted that, “while there is obviously much in terms of scholarship that Larry
is worth remembering for, what I will primarily remember him for is his inspiring
kindness.” Stefan J. Padfield, The Inspiring Kindness of Larry Ribstein, BUSINESS LAW PROF
BLOG (Dec. 25, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2011/12/theinspiring-kindness-of-larry-ribstein.html.
Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of
Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2011) (footnote omitted). Cf. Margaret
M. Blair, The Four Functions of Corporate Personhood 4 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law
& Legal Theory Working Paper, Paper No. 12-15, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037356 (“The four functions that legal entity status serve
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish using only transactional
contracts.”).
Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 218 (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Neary v. Miltronics Mfg. Servs., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 227, 231 (D.N.H. 2008)) (citing
Speir, supra note 20; Orts, supra note 20, at 69).
See David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social
Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1219 (2011) (discussing “The
State-Conferred Benefits Argument”); see also Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra
note 6, at 218–20 (rejecting Yosifon’s assertion that the state-conferred benefits argument
is one of the “‘tempting-but-ultimately-bad’ argument[s] . . . [for] regulating corporate
political speech”).
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1001
(2010) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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As I have also written elsewhere: “[t]he aggregate theory is generally
understood to capture the nexus-of-contracts view, the artificial entity theory
captures concession theory, and the real entity theory arguably captures the
40
director-primacy [and team-production] view of the corporation.” This last
point, that the team-production and director-primacy theories are best
aligned with real entity theory (rather than, for example, aggregate theory)
41
is certainly not without its controversy.
However, the director-primacy
theory of the corporation has been described as espousing “the view that the
maximization of shareholder wealth is the appropriate duty of directors . . .
[and] that resting authority over corporate decisions with a self-sustaining
42
board of directors is the best way to accomplish that objective,” and this
indeed lines up well with real-entity theory, which “represents the most
congenial view to corporate management, because it shields management
43
from undue interference from both shareholders and the state.”
Thus having set the stage in terms of corporate theory, we turn now to
the role of these theories in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance cases. I
will first examine the blockbuster Citizens United decision, followed by an
analysis of the key Supreme Court precedents leading up to that decision.

III. THE ROLE OF CORPORATE THEORY IN THE SUPREME COURT’S
CAMPAIGN FINANCE CASES
A. Citizens United
Citizens United involved a challenge to a federal statute, the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which prohibited “corporations and unions
from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures
for speech defined as an ‘electioneering communication’ or for speech
40
41

42
43

Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 215 (footnotes omitted).
Stephen Bainbridge rejects my argument that director-primacy theory is best aligned with
real entity theory. For a summary of our multi-blog post discussion of the issue, see
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/the-silent-role-of-corporate-theory-in-thesupreme-courts-ca-3.html. Stefan Padfield, The Silent Rule of Corporate Theory in the Supreme
Court’s Campaign Finance Cases (Part 4), THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Apr. 7, 2012, 5:46
PM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/the-silent-role-of-corporate-theory-inthe-supreme-courts-ca-3.html. On the other hand, Lynn Stout responded to my blog post
entitled,
Director-Primacy
and
Team-Production
as
Real
Entity
Theories,
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG
(June
3,
2012,
9:09
AM),
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/director-primacy-and-team-production-asreal-entity-theories.html, with an e-mail asserting that my description of the issue was “as
well put as I’ve seen it.” E-mail from Professor Lynn Stout to author (June 3, 2012) (on
file with author). Cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 10.
Verret, supra note 25, at 321 (identifying Stephen Bainbridge as “the leading proponent
of the director primacy view”).
Avi-Yonah, supra note 39, at 1032.
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expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.” The Supreme
Court held, among other things, that the First Amendment prohibits the
government from regulating the political speech of corporations on the
45
basis of their corporate identity. In doing so, the majority relied on a view
46
of the corporation as fundamentally an “association[] of citizens.” The
dissent of Justice Stevens, meanwhile, saw corporations as state-created
47
entities that: (1) “differ from natural persons in fundamental ways”;
48
(2) “have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires”;
and (3) “must engage the political process in instrumental terms if they are
49
to maximize shareholder value.” Of particular note, the dissent asserted
that “corporations have been ‘effectively delegated responsibility for
50
ensuring society’s economic welfare.’”
Despite the foregoing, Avi-Yonah has argued that Citizens United does not
in fact embody any corporate theory dispute because both the majority and
dissent embraced real-entity theory, while merely disagreeing on the
51
application of that theory to the facts of the case.
As I have argued
52
elsewhere, this contention is unpersuasive for at least three reasons. First,
44

45

46

47
48
49
50

51

52

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (citing 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b (2002)). See Tucker, supra note 4, at 512–13.
Following Buckley, the Court in Bellotti similarly rejected the equalization and
antidistortion rationales [for regulating corporate political speech] as being
unsupported by the record. Instead of rejecting the rationales wholesale, the
Court emphasized the lack of a record justifying the restriction. Alerted to the
need to develop a record regarding distortion harms to support expenditure
limits, Congress did so in passing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. Those
restrictions were subsequently recognized as valid in MCFL and Austin.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 885 (“Government may not suppress political speech based on
the speaker’s corporate identity.”) (overruling Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906–07 (asserting that the Court’s prior ruling in
Austin “permits the Government to ban the political speech of millions of associations of
citizens”); id. at 908 (asserting that under the challenged statute “certain disfavored
associations of citizens—those that have taken on the corporate form—are penalized for
engaging in . . . political speech”).
Id. at 971–72 n.72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 972.
Id. at 965.
Id. at 971 (quoting Milton C. Regan Jr., Corporate Speech and Civic Virtue, in DEBATING
DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN POLITICS, LAW, AND PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY
289, 302 (Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan Jr. eds., 1998)).
Avi-Yonah, supra note 39, at 1040 (“What is remarkable about Citizens United . . . is that
both the majority and the dissent adopted the real entity view of the corporation, so that
their only disagreement was in divergent assessments of the implications for the First
Amendment.”). Cf. Tucker, supra note 4, at 505 (“The majority in Citizens United
employed both the aggregation-of-rights and entity theory of corporations to reach its
conclusion that corporate political speech is to be treated the same as individual political
speech.”).
See Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 224–26.
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the majority’s emphasis on corporation-as-association-of-citizens is consistent
with the rhetoric of prior judicial opinions that Avi-Yonah himself identifies
53
as espousing the aggregate (i.e., contractarian) view. Second, Avi-Yonah’s
suggestion that “association-of-citizens” in Citizens United should be equated
with “corporate management working together as an association of persons”
because to equate it with the aggregate view would be to align the majority
opinion with the shareholder rights argument the majority rejected is belied
by the fact that (a) when the government argues that its regulations should
be upheld in order to protect shareholders, it is typically best understood as
advancing a concession theory argument and thus, “to reject the state’s
54
argument here is to reject concession theory, not the aggregate view,” and
(b) such a narrow interpretation of “association of citizens” is inconsistent
with the much broader use of that phrase in similar contexts by Justice
Scalia, whose concurring opinion Avi-Yonah focuses on in making his
55
“association of managers” argument.
Finally, as far as the dissent is
concerned, suffice it to say that I am not alone in seeing concession theory
jumping off the pages. Stephen Bainbridge entitled one of his blog posts
following the release of the opinion, “Stevens’ Pernicious Version of the
56
Concession Theory.”
Thus, I agree with Larry Ribstein, who was quoted as saying that “Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice Stevens’ dissent represent
57
diametrically opposed views of the corporation.”
Furthermore, the
centrality of corporate theory in Citizens United is not negated by the fact that
other considerations, like the listeners’ rights rationale mentioned above,
were also very important. As Anne Tucker explained:
In Buckley and Bellotti, the Court thwarted attempts to restrict
corporate political speech on the grounds that (1) speech is money;
(2) corporations contribute to the political marketplace of ideas;
53

54
55

56

57

See Avi-Yonah, supra note 39, at 1013, 1016 (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76
(1906); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189
(1888); Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 402–03 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883)).
See Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 225 (“[I]t is the artificial entity
[concession] view, rather than the aggregate view, which favors regulatory solutions.”).
See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“‘Attention all citizens. To assure the fairness of elections by preventing
disproportionate expression of the views of any single powerful group, your Government
has decided that the following associations of persons shall be prohibited from speaking
or writing in support of any candidate: _____.’”).
Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC: Stevens’ Pernicious Version of the Concession
Theory,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
(Jan.
21,
2010,
4:05
PM),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-unitedv-fec-stevens-pernicious-version-of-the-concession-theory.html.
Larry E. Ribstein, Citizens United v. FEC: A Roundtable Discussion, FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR
L. & PUB. POL’Y STUD. (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/
dbtid.38/default.asp.
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(3) there is no special threat of distortion or need to equalize individual
and corporate voices; (4) corporate political speech implicates freedom
of association rights; and (5) concerns of compelled shareholder speech
do not justify restricting corporate political speech. In subsequent cases
such as Massachusetts Citizens for Life (“MCFL”) and Austin, however, the
Court utilized some of these same arguments to explain or validate
certain restrictions on corporate political speech. Later, in Citizens
United, however, the Court employed the same lines of reasoning
advanced in the cases discussed below, to equalize corporate and
individual speech thus expanding corporate First Amendment rights.
The Court’s application of these common arguments—as either an attack
against or support for corporate political speech restrictions—depends
on both the Court’s constitutional conceptualization of corporations and
its assumptions about the roles, rights, and responsibilities of
58
corporations in our economic and legal society.

What then becomes so striking is the majority’s silence on the issue of
corporate theory along with the dissent’s express disavowal of any role for
corporate theory. Wrote Justice Stevens: “Nothing in this analysis turns on
whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state
concession, . . . a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, . . . a mediated
59
hierarchy of stakeholders, . . . or any other recognized model.”
I have
written elsewhere that there are a number of possible explanations for this
apparent contradiction, including “(1) federalism concerns; (2) a failure to
appreciate the significance of corporate theory; and/or (3) a desire to avoid
the
appearance
of
imposing
unconstitutional
conditions
on
60
incorporation.”
As for the federalism concerns, the Supreme Court has itself described
corporations as “entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of
61
state law.” As I have written elsewhere: “Would the Court now turn around
62
and tell states what they had created?” Even with the Court avoiding a
direct confrontation on this issue by focusing on listeners’ rights rather than
corporate theory, at least some states are still nonetheless pushing back. For
example, in Western Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Attorney General, the Montana
Supreme Court upheld state campaign finance laws targeting corporations
63
despite the obvious conflict with Citizens United, because “unlike Citizens

58
59

60
61
62
63

Tucker, supra note 4, at 509.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 n.72 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12 (1996); Blair & Stout, supra
note 10 )).
Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 226–27 (footnotes omitted).
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
Padfield, Citizens United and the Nexus-of-Contracts Presumption, supra note 8, at 27.
Western Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 13 (Mont. 2011).
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United, this case concerns Montana law, Montana elections and it arises from
64
Montana history.”
The majority and dissent in Citizens United may also have simply failed to
recognize the significance of corporate theory. In other words, both sides
may have felt their view of the corporation was so obviously correct as to not
require further discussion. One can perhaps see this perspective in action in
the very footnote in which Justice Stevens disavows any role for corporate
theory. It is in this footnote that he states as a simple matter of fact that: “It
is not necessary to agree on a precise theory of the corporation to agree that
corporations differ from natural persons in fundamental ways, and that a
legislature might therefore need to regulate them differently if it is human
65
welfare that is the object of its concern.”
Yet the contention that
corporations are fundamentally more than mere associations of citizens, and
therefore subject to special regulation, directly implicates concession theory
and is precisely the type of conceptualization of corporations that the
majority rejected.
Finally, the dissent may have been motivated to avoid the issue of
corporate theory for fear of setting off an “unconstitutional conditions”
66
debate.
The majority asserted that: “It is rudimentary that the State
cannot exact as the price of those special [corporate] advantages the
67
forfeiture of First Amendment rights.”
If one understands concession
theory to justify state regulation of corporations on the basis of their special
status under state law, then avoiding concession theory may allow one to
68
avoid allegations of imposing unconstitutional conditions.
64

65
66

67
68

Id. at 6; see also id. at 11 (“The question then, is when in the last 99 years did Montana lose
the power or interest sufficient to support the statute, if it ever did.”). Shortly before this
Article was finalized, the United States Supreme Court summarily reversed the Montana
decision. Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 n.72 (2010).
See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 395 (1998) (“The ‘doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions’ holds that the government ordinarily may not grant a benefit on the
condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government
may withhold that benefit altogether.”).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905 (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
But cf. Michael Boardman, Constitutional Conditions: Regulating Independent Political
Expenditures by Government Contractors After Citizens United, 10 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 25, 44–
45 (2011) (“[T]he unconstitutional conditions doctrine . . . applies where the
government conditions a discretionary benefit with the waiver of a fundamental
right . . . . To satisfy the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the restriction at issue must
have a substantial nexus with the purpose of the [benefit]. . . . At face value, restrictions
on political speech by government contractors have little to do with the purpose of the
contracts themselves—contracts for Lockheed Martin to build airplanes, for example,
would not necessarily be substantially related to their right to engage in political
speech.”). See generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and
the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 929 n.278 (2011) (citing
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Regardless, the weight of the rhetoric in the opinion that I have set forth
above indicates that there is indeed a silent corporate theory debate raging
in Citizens United. This has led me to question whether this silent debate was
unique to Citizens United or something that had been going on for some
time. In order to find out, I went back and reviewed the major Supreme
Court campaign finance cases relied upon in Citizens United. What follows
are the results of my review.

B. The Cases Leading Up to Citizens United
The primary campaign finance cases that the Citizens United Court relied
69
70
upon were (in chronological order) : (1) Buckley v. Valeo (1976); (2) First
71
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978); (3) Federal Election Commission v.
72
National Right to Work Committee (1982) (“NRWC”); (4) Federal Election
73
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (1986) (“MCFL”); (5) Austin
74
v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce (1990); (6) McConnell v. Federal Election
75
Commission (2003); and (7) Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to
76
Life, Inc. (2007) (“WRTL”). I will briefly review each of these cases below,
focusing particularly on what I see as the role corporate theory played in

69

70
71
72
73
74
75
76

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 113–15 (1993) (discussing the
protection of corporate First Amendment speech as requiring an “unconstitutional
conditions” analysis); Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right
That Big Corporations Should Have But Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 650
(2011) (discussing the free speech benefits of the Lochner era); Larry E. Ribstein, The
Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95, 96 (1995) (noting
that although issues related to constitutional limits on government power over
corporations “generally have been examined through the broad lens of constitutional
law, their resolution has in fact often depended on how the corporation is
characterized”); see also id. at 105–08 (discussing and criticizing Epstein’s
“unconstitutional conditions” model)).
The six most cited cases in Citizens United in order of citation frequency were: (1) Austin
v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); (2) McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); (3) Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam); (4) First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); (5) Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); and (6) Fed. Election Comm’n v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986). Cf. Tucker, supra note 4, at 508 (“In
applying the First Amendment to corporations, four cases are essential to understand the
constitutional trajectory of the corporate political speech doctrine prior to Citizens United:
Buckley v. Valeo, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc., and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.” (footnotes omitted)).
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down regulation of corporate political speech).
459 U.S. 197 (1982) (upholding regulation of corporate political speech).
479 U.S. 238 (1986) (striking down regulation of corporate political speech).
494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding regulation of corporate political speech).
540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding regulation of corporate political speech).
551 U.S. 449 (2007) (striking down regulation of corporate political speech).
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each. I ultimately argue that corporate theory was relevant in five of the
seven cases.
Because I want to focus on the corporate-theory aspects of these cases, it
makes sense to begin at the end of the list because WRTL is one of the cases
listed that does not really have much to say about corporate theory (the
other is Buckley). After explaining why WRTL was nonetheless so heavily
relied upon in Citizens United, I will address the remaining cases in
chronological order.

1. Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
In WRTL, the Court “found an unconstitutional application of § 441b
77
where the speech was not ‘express advocacy or its functional equivalent.’”
The Court thus adopted “an objective ‘appeal to vote’ test for determining
whether a communication was the functional equivalent of express
78
advocacy.” The reason WRTL was subsequently so hotly debated in Citizens
United is that the dissent took WRTL to stand for the proposition that it was
possible to deal with cases like Citizens United on an as-applied basis, and that
to go on to invalidate the statute under a facial challenge was essentially to
repudiate WRTL without any record to suggest the approach adopted in
79
WRTL was a failure. Rather, the dissent argued that WRTL in fact not only
stood for the proposition that § 441b was constitutional, but actually made it
more likely that the corporate independent expenditure provision being
challenged was valid even in light of Buckley (which had held that restriction
of independent expenditures by individuals violated the First Amendment,
80
while restriction of direct contributions to candidates did not) because it
narrowed the types of speech that would be restricted under § 441b and thus
increased the likelihood that those expenditures covered by the statute post77

78
79

80

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889 (2010) (quoting WRTL, 551
U.S. at 481); see also WRTL, 551 U.S. at 449 (“Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) makes it a federal crime for a corporation to use its general
treasury funds to pay for any ‘electioneering communication.’” (quoting 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b)(2) (2006)).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 895 (quoting WRTL, 551 U.S. at 470).
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 933 n.5 (Stephens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“[T]he majority’s argument for striking down § 203 depends on its contention that
the statute has proved too ‘chilling’ in practice—and in particular on the contention that
the controlling opinion in WRTL . . . failed to bring sufficient clarity and ‘breathing
space’ to this area of law. . . . We have no record with which to assess that claim.”
(citations omitted)).
See id. at 964–65 (“Buckley expressly contemplated that an anticorruption rationale might
justify restrictions on independent expenditures at a later date, ‘because it may be that, in
some circumstances, “large independent expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or
apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions.”’” (quoting WRTL, 551
U.S. at 478)).

850

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:3

WRTL would facilitate corruption in a way that justified restriction under the
81
Obviously, the Citizens United majority vehemently
First Amendment.
disagreed that WRTL constituted any sort of a roadblock on its march to
82
invalidate the statute, or that to do so would somehow repudiate WRTL.
However, there was no identifiable corporate theory dispute in WRTL that
would be relevant to our discussion here.

2. Buckley v. Valeo
In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that federal statutory provisions
limiting individual contributions to campaigns were constitutional, but that
provisions limiting individual independent expenditures impermissibly
83
abridged freedom of speech. As provided by statute:
The term “independent expenditure” means an expenditure by a
person—(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate; and (B) that is not made in concert or cooperation
with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s
authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party
84
committee or its agents.

Buckley also did not directly address corporate political speech, but
constitutes important precedent for Citizens United because it differentiated
85
direct contributions from independent expenditures. There is thus little in
81

82

83

84
85

See id. at 967 n.66 (“[T]he notion that the ‘electioneering communications’ covered by
§ 203 can breed quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption has only
become more plausible since we decided McConnell. . . . [A]fter WRTL, a corporate or
union expenditure could be regulated under § 203 only if everyone would understand it
as an endorsement of or attack on a particular candidate for office. It does not take
much imagination to perceive why this type of advocacy might be especially apt to look
like or amount to a deal or a threat.” (quoting WRTL, 551 U.S. at 465)).
Id. at 918 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“This case is different—not, as the dissent suggests,
because the approach taken in WRTL has been deemed a ‘failure,’ . . . but because, in the
absence of any valid narrower ground of decision, there is no way to avoid Citizens
United’s broader constitutional argument.” (citation omitted)).
Id. at 901–02 (majority opinion) (“The Buckley Court explained that the potential for quid
pro quo corruption distinguished direct contributions to candidates from independent
expenditures. The Court emphasized that ‘the independent expenditure ceiling . . . fails
to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of
corruption in the electoral process,’ . . . because ‘[t]he absence of prearrangement and
coordination . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for
improper commitments from the candidate.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1976)).
2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006).
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902 (“Buckley did not consider § 610’s separate ban on
corporate and union independent expenditures . . . .”); id. at 954 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“Buckley famously (or infamously) distinguished direct
contributions from independent expenditures, . . . but its silence on corporations only
reinforced the understanding that corporate expenditures could be treated differently
from individual expenditures. (citation omitted)).
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the way of silent corporate theory at work in Buckley. However, the statement
in the per curiam opinion that “the concept that government may restrict
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
86
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment,” arguably
becomes a tool of the aggregate view of the corporation advanced by the
majority in Citizens United insofar as corporations are there deemed to be just
87
another “element[] of our society.”

3. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
In Bellotti, the Court overturned a criminal statute prohibiting
corporations from making expenditures to influence the outcome of a vote
on any question other than questions materially affecting the business of the
88
corporation.
Here, the issue of corporate political speech is front and
center, yet there is again no express discussion of particular theories of the
89
corporation.
Rather, we can see the silent corporate theory debate
between contract and concession in some of the language used by the
majority and dissent. For example, one can see the contractarian view of
corporations as equivalent to other associations of citizens when the majority
says: “The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
90
whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”
Likewise, the

86

87

88

89

90

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49. John Rawls focused on this quote in criticizing Buckley:
The Court fails to recognize the essential point that the fair value of the political
liberties is required for a just political procedure, and that to insure their fair value
it is necessary to prevent those with greater property and wealth, and the greater
skills of organization which accompany them, from controlling the electoral
process to their advantage.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EXPANDED EDITION 360 (2005). See also id. at 359
(“Buckley and its sequel First National Bank [v. Bellotti] are profoundly dismaying.” (citation
omitted)).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904; see also id. at 957 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The majority emphasizes Buckley’s statement that ‘the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.’”).
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See also id. at 785 n.22 (“We know
of no documentation of the notion that corporations are likely to share a monolithic view
on an issue such as the adoption of a graduated personal income tax. Corporations, like
individuals or groups, are not homogeneous.” (emphasis added)). It should be noted here
that it is, however, not too difficult to imagine large swaths of corporations being united
in opposing all sorts of cost-imposing regulation.
Cf. id. at 823 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today affirms that the failure of
[some prior] cases to draw distinctions between artificial and natural persons does not
mean that no such distinctions may be drawn. The Court explicitly states that
corporations may not enjoy all the political liberties of natural persons, although it fails to
articulate the basis of its suggested distinction.”).
Id. at 777 (majority opinion).
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contractarian notion that corporations, as mere associations of citizens, start
with the presumption of rights akin to other associations (with the burden of
proof on those who would limit such rights), can be seen when the majority
finds “no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions
of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within
the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because
91
its source is a corporation.” Finally, the majority clearly placed itself in
opposition to the concession view when it characterized as “extreme” the
view that “corporations, as creatures of the State, have only those rights
92
granted them by the State.”
The Bellotti dissent of Justice White (joined by Justice Brennan and
Justice Marshall), on the other hand, employed language very much
consistent with a concession view of corporations:
Corporations are artificial entities created by law for the purpose of
furthering certain economic goals. In order to facilitate the achievement
of such ends, special rules relating to such matters as limited liability,
perpetual life, and the accumulation, distribution, and taxation of assets
are normally applied to them. States have provided corporations with
such attributes in order to increase their economic viability and thus
strengthen the economy generally. It has long been recognized however,
that the special status of corporations has placed them in a position to
control vast amounts of economic power which may, if not regulated,
dominate not only the economy but also the very heart of our
93
democracy, the electoral process.

Furthermore, the dissent of then-Justice Rehnquist quoted with approval the
language from Dartmouth College that Justice Stevens cited as an example of
94
concession theory in Citizens United:
Early in our history, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall described the status of a
corporation in the eyes of federal law: “A corporation is an artificial
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which
the charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental
to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to
95
effect the object for which it was created.”

Thus, it is fair to read Bellotti as embodying the same type of silent corporate
theory debate as I have identified in Citizens United.

91
92
93
94
95

Id. at 784.
Id. at 778 n.14.
Id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting). See also id. (“The State need not permit its own creation
to consume it.”).
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 n.72 (Stevens, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (citing Dartmouth College as example of concession theory).
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist’s stand-alone dissent in Bellotti provides
arguably the sole example in these opinions of a Justice affirmatively
adopting a theory of the corporation for purposes of determining the
constitutional rights of corporations—though not via the express adoption
of one of the traditionally recognized theories. Specifically, Justice
Rehnquist relied on Justice Marshall’s Dartmouth College opinion to conclude
that: “Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a corporation
does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons . . . our
inquiry must seek to determine which constitutional protections are
96
‘incidental to its very existence.’”
Thus, while it may be true that “a
corporation’s right of commercial speech . . . might be considered
necessarily incidental to the business of a commercial corporation[, i]t
cannot be so readily concluded that the right of political expression is
equally necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation organized for
97
commercial purposes.”
I would argue that this is a formulation most
aligned with concession theory because not only does Justice Rehnquist rely
on Dartmouth College, but he also goes on to say: “I would think that any
particular form of organization upon which the State confers special
privileges or immunities different from those of natural persons would be
subject to like regulation, whether the organization is a labor union, a
98
partnership, a trade association, or a corporation.”

4. Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work
Committee
In NRWC, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the Federal Election
Campaign Act’s prohibition against corporations making political
contributions from their general treasury. It did so by upholding the
Federal Election Commission’s determination that NRWC, a political action
committee, had violated the Act by soliciting contributions from persons
99
who were not its “members.” That is to say, the Court upheld a restriction
96
97

98
99

Id. at 824 (citation omitted) (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518,
636 (1819)).
Id. at 825 (footnote omitted). Cf. id. at 827 (“One need not adopt such a restrictive view
of the political liberties of business corporations to affirm the judgment of the Supreme
Judicial Court in this case. That court reasoned that this Court’s decisions entitling the
property of a corporation to constitutional protection should be construed as recognizing
the liberty of a corporation to express itself on political matters concerning that
property.”).
Id. at 826–27.
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 198 n.1 (1982) (“The
term ‘contribution’ is defined broadly, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C), to include any sort of
transfer of money or services to various political entities, but excluded from that
definition is ‘the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a
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on corporate political speech. In doing so, the Court deferred to
Congressional determinations regarding corruption and the dangers
inherent in the corporate form. Specifically, the Court held that the stategranted “special advantages” of the corporate form justified state regulation
to prevent abuse. The Court stated:
The first purpose of § 441b, [the government] states, is to ensure that
substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages
which go with the corporate form of organization should not be
converted into political “war chests” which could be used to incur
political debts from legislators who are aided by the contributions. . . .
The second purpose . . . is to protect the individuals who have paid
money into a corporation . . . . We agree . . . that these purposes are
100
sufficient to justify the regulation at issue.

Since this was a unanimous opinion, there is no opposing side of any
101
corporate theory debate present.
Nonetheless, in terms of a running
theme within all the opinions I discuss herein, NRWC stands as yet another
place where rhetoric consistent with concession theory is aligned with
deferring to state regulation of corporate speech.

5. Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc.
In MCFL, the Court created an exception to the Federal Election
Campaign Act for any corporation that: (1) was formed for the express
purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business
activities; (2) has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a
claim on its assets or earnings; and, (3) was not established by a business
corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions
102
from such entities.
The Court arguably relied on a contractarian view of
the corporation in order to limit the scope of regulation. Said the majority:
“Voluntary political associations do not suddenly present the specter of

100

101

102

separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a . . . corporation without
capital stock.’”).
Id. at 207–08. See also id. at 209 (“The statute reflects a legislative judgment that the
special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation.”).
Cf. id. at 210 (“[T]he ‘differing structures and purposes’ of different entities ‘may require
different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process.’”
(quoting Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981))).
Cf. Charles N. Eberhardt, Note, Integrating the Right of Association with the Bellotti Right to
Hear—Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc., 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 159, 176 n.110 (1986) (“Arguably, NRWC turns on the kind of expression
involved: the solicitations in question resembled contributions more than expenditures
and as such merited less first amendment protection under the Buckley rule.”).
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986).
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103

The majority also
corruption merely by assuming the corporate form.”
expressly tried to recast earlier pro-regulatory opinions as not constituting
referendums on the corporate form: “Regulation of corporate political
activity . . . has reflected concern not about use of the corporate form per se,
but about the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for political
104
purposes.”
The dissent in MCFL, meanwhile, expressed disappointment at what it
saw as the Court turning away from precedent that had acknowledged that
the unique state-conferred benefits bestowed on corporations could justify
limitations on corporate political speech. Specifically, in Federal Election
105
Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee (“NCPAC”), the
Court had declined to extend NRWC’s restriction of corporate political
speech to Political Action Committees (“PACs”). The Court in NCPAC had
said: “While in NRWC we held that the compelling governmental interest in
preventing corruption supported the restriction of the influence of political
war chests funneled through the corporate form, in the present cases we do
not believe that a similar finding is supportable . . . . Even assuming that
Congress could fairly conclude that large-scale PACs have a sufficient
tendency to corrupt, the overbreadth of § 9012(f) in these cases is so great
106
that the section may not be upheld.”
The MCFL dissent read NCPAC as
continuing
to recognize what had been, until today, an acceptable distinction,
grounded in the judgment of the political branch, between political
activity by corporate actors and that by organizations not benefiting from
‘the corporate shield which the State [has] granted to corporations as a
107
form of quid pro quo’ for various regulations.

Given that the state-conferred benefits argument advanced by the dissent in
MCFL is properly aligned with concession theory, MCFL can be read as
another case wherein a silent corporate theory debate was at work.

6. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
In Austin, one of the two main decisions overruled by Citizens United, the
Supreme Court held that the unique state-conferred corporate structure

103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 263.
Id. at 259 (footnote omitted).
470 U.S. 480 (1985).
Id. at 500–01
479 U.S. 238, 270 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens Against Rent
Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)); see also id. at
267 (“In light of the ‘special advantages that the State confers on the corporate form,’ . . .
we have considered these [anti-corruption and shareholder protection] dangers
sufficient to justify restrictions on corporate political activity.” (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
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which facilitates the amassing of large treasuries warrants limits on corporate
108
independent expenditures. Said the Court:
State law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and
distribution of assets—that enhance their ability to attract capital and to
deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on their
shareholders’ investments. These state-created advantages not only allow
corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but also
permit them to use “resources amassed in the economic marketplace” to
109
obtain “an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.”

In dissent, Justice Scalia made clear that he viewed distinctions based
solely on the corporate form to be insidious because corporations were just
one of many types of associations of citizens: “Attention all citizens. To
assure the fairness of elections by preventing disproportionate expression of
the views of any single powerful group, your Government has decided that
the following associations of persons shall be prohibited from speaking or
110
writing in support of any candidate: _____.”
The contractarian point of
view here could not be starker—corporations are literally interchangeable
with any other association.

7. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
Finally, in the other major case Citizens United overruled, McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission, the Court upheld the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act’s (“BCRA”) extension (via § 203) of § 441b’s restrictions on
111
independent corporate expenditures.
The majority again relied upon
what can fairly be characterized as an artificial entity view: “[W]hether the
state interest is compelling—is easily answered by our prior decisions
regarding campaign finance regulation, which ‘represent respect for the
“legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate

108

109
110
111

Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). See Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010) (“[In Austin,] the Michigan Chamber
of Commerce sought to use general treasury funds to run a newspaper ad supporting a
specific candidate.
Michigan law, however, prohibited corporate independent
expenditures that supported or opposed any candidate for state office. A violation of the
law was punishable as a felony. The Court sustained the speech prohibition.”).
Id. at 658–59.
Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
540 U.S. 93, 132 (2003) (“BCRA’s central provisions are designed to address Congress’
concerns about the increasing use of soft money and issue advertising to influence
federal elections. . . . Title II primarily prohibits corporations and labor unions from
using general treasury funds for communications that are intended to, or have the effect
of, influencing the outcome of federal elections.”).
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structure require particularly careful regulation.”’”
meanwhile, repeated the “mere association” refrain:

The dissent,

In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utility Commission of California, . . . we
held unconstitutional a state effort to compel corporate speech. “The
identity of the speaker,” we said, “is not decisive in determining whether
speech is protected.
Corporations and other associations, like
individuals, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination
113
of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster.”

This review of the primary campaign finance cases leading up to, and
relied upon in, Citizens United should make clear that an on-going debate
about the nature of corporations has been central to the resolution of these
cases, despite the fact that none of the opinions have expressly referenced
corporate theory. So, what are we to make of this silent corporate theory
debate? The answer I propose here is to call on all judges in relevant cases
to expressly state their views about which corporate theory is best. This
should improve the transparency of judicial opinions, as well as the
accountability of judges. What follows is a brief overview of just a couple of
the ways the issue of corporate theory continues to make its way before the
Court post-Citizens United. The cases discussed demonstrate that, not
surprisingly, the status of corporations in our modern society is not an issue
that is going to go away any time soon.

IV. JUDGING CORPORATIONS POST-CITIZENS UNITED
While the Citizens United decision cautions against betting on the
corporate theory debate being addressed expressly by the Court any time
soon, there should be no shortage of opportunities to challenge the Court
on that point, since cases raising the question of what corporations are, and
how we should best conceptualize them, are likely to continue to confront
the Court with regularity. By way of example, one can examine the case of
Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, which followed Citizens United by
little more than a year and examined whether the Freedom of Information
Act’s protection of “personal privacy” protects the “privacy” of corporate
114
entities.
The Court ultimately decided the case on the basis of statutory
construction: “‘Person’ is a defined term in the statute [and expressly
includes corporations]; ‘personal’ is not. When a statute does not define a
term, we typically ‘give the phrase its ordinary meaning.’ . . . ‘Personal’
115
ordinarily refers to individuals.”
However, the case simply begs the
112
113
114
115

Id. at 205 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003)).
Id. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).
131 S. Ct. 1177, 1180 (2011).
Id. at 1182 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1267 (2010)).
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question of whether corporations should have personal privacy rights. Wrote
Stephen Bainbridge in response to the opinion:
I agree . . . [with the] concern that US law confers personhood on the
corporation without a coherent theory of why it does so or where the
boundaries of that legal fiction are to be located. As I complained after
the recent AT&T decision: Chief Justice Roberts could have summed up
his opinion far more succinctly: “Because at least 5 of us say so.” The
Citizens United decision last term [also] attracted much criticism . . . for
holding that a corporation is a person and as such has certain
constitutional rights. While I agreed with the holding, I was disturbed
that the Chief Justice’s majority opinion for the Supreme Court so
obviously lacked a coherent theory of the nature of the corporation and,
as such, also lacked a coherent theory of what legal rights the
corporation possesses. The utterly specious word games that drive this
opinion simply confirm that Chief Justice Roberts has failed to articulate
116
a plausible analytical framework for this important problem.

The Court will continue to subject itself to similar criticism so long as it
declines to expressly adopt a “plausible analytical framework” in the form of
a particular theory of the corporation.
117
Looking ahead, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Court will
soon be addressing the question whether federal courts in the United States
may exercise jurisdiction over corporations pursuant to the Alien Tort
Statute, which gives federal courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
118
treaty of the United States.”
The Second Circuit, in ruling on the case
below, identified the relevant issue as “the treatment of corporations as a
119
matter of customary international law.”
This may at first blush suggest
corporate theory is irrelevant because the question is not why corporations
116

117

118
119

Stephen Bainbridge, Schumpeter on Corporate Personhood, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Mar.
26, 2011, 6:43 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/
2011/03/schumpeter-on-corporate-personhood.html.
621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 101491). See John Bellinger, Kiobel: Supplemental Briefs on Extraterritoriality are In…,
LAWFARE (Aug. 14, 2012, 10:52 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/kiobelsupplemental-briefs-on-extraterritoriality-are-in/ (“[I]n March the Supreme Court
ordered the case of Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum to be re-briefed and reargued to address
the additional question of whether the Alien Tort Statute applies to violations of
international law occurring in the sovereign territory of other countries. The final
supplemental briefs were filed on August 8.”).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, 117 n.11 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted) (“The idea that
corporations are ‘persons’ with duties, liabilities, and rights has a long history in
American domestic law. . . . It is an idea that continues to evolve in complex and
unexpected ways. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 50 (2010).
The history of corporate rights and obligations under domestic law is, however, entirely
irrelevant to the issue before us—namely, the treatment of corporations as a matter of
customary international law.” (internal citations omitted)).

Jan. 2013]

SILENT ROLE OF CORPORATE THEORY

859

are treated a particular way under international law, but rather simply how
120
they are in fact treated. Nevertheless, it may again be difficult to separate
a conclusion about the scope of the statute from preconceived notions about
what corporations are. For example, the Brief Amicus Curiae for the
121
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law in Support of Petitioners
notes the following:
In his opinion denying rehearing, a distinguished member of the panel
majority below asserted that requiring multinational corporations to
defend against customary international law claims in United States courts
would subject them to “extort[ed]” settlements, and unjustifiably
“beggar” them. . . . Such a canard is deeply troubling, not only because it
is so clearly legislative in nature, but because it is premised on an
indefensible assumption that corporations are freestanding entities less
122
prone to great evil than the fallible human beings who constitute them.

These are only two examples. However, given the prominent role of
corporations in our modern society, it should not be too hard to convince
anyone of the proposition that many other cases like these—raising the
question of how we should best define corporations—will confront the
123
Court with regularity.
In light of this, one may ask what impact the Court expressly adopting a
theory of the corporation would have. First, “bringing this debate to the
surface would allow commentators and advocates to better hold judges
accountable for their decisions by leaving the judges less ‘wiggle room’ once
they have expressly aligned themselves with a particular theory, even if the
120

121

122
123

The question presented may ultimately extend even further beyond corporate theory. See
Lyle Denniston, Kiobel to be expanded and reargued, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 5, 2012, 2:01 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/03/kiobel-to-be-reargued/ (noting that the Supreme
Court “ordered lawyers to come back with an expanded argument on the scope of a 1789
law giving aliens a right to sue in U.S. courts. . . . [S]ome of the Justices . . . questioned
whether the Alien Tort Statute allowed U.S. courts to hear lawsuits for violations of
international law on foreign soil”).
Brief Amicus Curiae for the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law in Support
of Petitioners at 1, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (Dec. 21, 2011) (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL 6813566.
Id. at 1 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 270–72 (2d Cir.
2011) (opinion of Chief Judge Jacobs concurring in the denial of panel rehearing)).
See Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 235 (“A second timely debate that
implicates corporate theory is proxy access.” (citing Larry Ribstein, The securities laws and
the First Amendment, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Dec. 28, 2010), http://
truthonthemarket.com/2010/12/28/the-securities-laws-and-the-first-amendment/
(suggesting that after Citizens United the Court will be less inclined to respect distinctions
that up till now have been cited to support regulation of corporate speech in areas like
shareholder proposals))); id. (citing Larry Ribstein, The SEC, global warming and the First
Amendment, IDEOBLOG (Jan. 29, 2010, 6:35 AM), http://busmovie.typepad.com/
ideoblog/2010/01/the-sec-global-warming-and-the-first-amendment.html (making a
similar argument in terms of Citizens United’s impact on the SEC’s ability to require
corporate disclosures on climate change)).
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124

Second, even where judges are able to avoid being
debate is on-going.”
held accountable in this way because “the application of legal theories is
more fact specific, and therefore arguably more imprecise, than their
125
adoption,” bringing the clash of corporate theories into the sunlight
should nonetheless “serve to illuminate corporate law debates and rarefy the
126
opposing parties.”
A further potential benefit of having judges expressly
adopt particular theories of the corporation in relevant cases is that it may
clarify which party has the burden of proof. For example, under the
concession theory of the corporation, more of the burden would fall on
127
those seeking to limit the state’s ability to regulate its creations.
Nonetheless, there are some valid criticisms of my proposal, and I discuss
some of them next.

V. CRITICISMS OF CORPORATE THEORY’S RELEVANCE
Some have suggested that the debate about the nature of the
corporation has run its course. Stephen Bainbridge has noted that, “the
debate . . . is over . . . . Contractarians and noncontractarians no longer have
128
much of interest to say to one another.” However, I would submit that all
of the foregoing discussion highlighting the on-going silent corporate
theory debate raging in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance cases
suggests that contractarians and non-contractarians are still very much
engaged. Of course, Bainbridge may more properly be understood to be
saying that all the relevant arguments on each side have been fleshed out.
Thus, what is merely going on in these cases is fulfillment of the old saw that,
while everything’s already been said, it has not yet been said by everyone.
124
125
126

127

128

Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 228.
Id.
Verret, supra note 25, at 315. Cf. Roger Martin, Fixing the Game: The Unintended
Consequences of an Economic Theory, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 27, 2011, 2:40 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-martin/fixing-the-game-the-unint_b_854481.html
(“The only way we can avoid increasingly frequent stock market meltdowns—and all the
pain, suffering and economic dislocation they cause—is to explore the theories that
underpin American capitalism.”).
Compare Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 925 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“Though faced with a constitutional text that makes no distinction between
types of speakers, the dissent feels no necessity to provide even an isolated statement from
the founding era to the effect that corporations are not covered, but places the burden on
petitioners to bring forward statements showing that they are . . . .”), with id. at 950 n.55
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Given that corporations were
conceived of as artificial entities and do not have the technical capacity to ‘speak,’ the
burden of establishing that the Framers and ratifiers understood ‘the freedom of speech’
to encompass corporate speech is, I believe, far heavier than the majority
acknowledges.”).
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 31 (2002) (“[T]he debate
has been fully played out.”).
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Nonetheless, even here I would posit that new arguments continue to be
made. For example, I have argued elsewhere that the official arrival of the
too-big-to-fail corporation, which arguably made its grand entrance as a part
of the financial crisis of 2008, constituted a new “data point” in the
129
corporate theory debate.
David Millon presents a further criticism when he argues that:
“Historically, the political implications of the natural/artificial and
entity/aggregate distinctions have been ambiguous, meaning different
130
things at different times.” However, Millon is arguably best understood as
warning us about the complexities of corporate theory’s “legitimatizing
131
function,” as opposed to disputing that there is any such function at all. In
other words, while it may not be possible to tie a particular corporate theory
to a particular result in a particular case, corporate theory may nonetheless
make a particular outcome more or less likely. This view is consistent with
the general alignment of “nexus-of-contracts theory with de-regulation, and
concession theory with a fear of the negative consequences of de132
regulation.”
It is also worth noting that Millon was responding to the
129

130

131

132

Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 209–12 (arguing that Dodd-Frank’s
official recognition of the too-big-to-fail corporation undermined the majority’s opinion
in Citizens United because that opinion rested on a theory of the corporation that espouses
a worldview wherein deregulated markets lead to efficiency, not global crisis).
Millon, supra note 33, at 202. See also Avi-Yonah, supra note 39, at 1022–23.
In 1926, John Dewey published an article in the Yale Law Journal in which he
dismisses as irrelevant the debate among the aggregate, artificial entity, and real
entity views of the corporation. These views, he explains, could be deployed to
suit any purpose; and he uses examples relying on the cyclical nature of these
theories. His conclusion is that theory should be abandoned for an examination of
reality.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal
Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 673 (1926)). Cf. Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate
Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1631 (2011) (“[A] metaphor or philosophical
conception of the corporation is not helpful for the type of functional analysis that the
Court should conduct. The Court should consider the purpose of the constitutional
right at issue . . . .”). But see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 106 (1992) (“[J]ohn Dewey . . . could
not, I believe, have demonstrated successfully that each theory of corporate personality
could have equally legitimated the practices of emergent large-scale business
enterprise.”).
See Millon, supra note 33, at 241 (“[P]articular theories of the corporation are perceived
to justify particular legal rules or, at a more general level, a particular approach to
regulation. Although th[is] legitimation claim is a plausible interpretation . . . the
connection between corporate theory and doctrinal and social developments is, in fact, a
good deal more complex. We have yet to develop an adequate account of corporate
theory’s legitimating function.”).
Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 228. See C. T. CARR, THE GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 165–73 (1905) (describing the concession
theory of corporate powers as a response to fears about threats of corporate power to the
sovereignty of the King); Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate
Regulation, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 135, 138 (2009) (“The most problematic
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arguments of the esteemed scholar Morton Horwitz, who described
corporate theory as having “determinat[ive] normative implications” and
playing a significant role in “the legitimation of legal doctrine and social
133
practice.” As Horwitz put it:
I wish to dispute [the] conclusion that particular conceptions of
corporate personality were used just as easily to limit as to enhance
corporate power. I hope to show that, for example, the rise of a natural
entity theory of the corporation was a major factor in legitimating big
business and that none of the other theoretical alternatives could provide
as
much
sustenance
to
newly
organized,
concentrated
enterprise. . . . [W]hen abstract conceptions are used in specific
historical contexts, they do acquire more limited meanings and more
134
specific argumentative functions.

Ultimately, we need look no further than Citizens United itself for
corporate theory’s relevancy. Citizens United’s conclusion that political
speech restrictions may not be imposed on the basis of corporate status
alone would simply not have been possible under concession theory, which
essentially turns on the idea that corporations are different. Rather, the
result seemingly requires adoption of the contractarian view that
corporations are merely associations of citizens—indistinguishable in any
135
meaningful way from the bevy of other associations that dot the landscape.
Finally, it can be argued that even if corporate theory is less deterministic
than I suggest herein, it nonetheless serves an important legitimization
function. That is to say, the average citizen hears the corporate theory story
they are being told in these cases whether it is conveyed expressly or not.

133
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135

portion of the nexus-of-contracts framework for me has been the normative claim that
many proponents of the framework have proffered: that, because the corporation can be
viewed as this bundle of privately ordered contracts, regulation is largely unnecessary and
undesirable.” (footnote omitted)).
Millon, supra note 33, at 204 (citing Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 221–22 (1985)).
HORWITZ, supra note 130, at 68; see also DAVID A. WESTBROOK, BETWEEN CITIZEN AND
STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATION 135 (2007) (“[A]lthough theories [of
the corporation] are not determinative, from time to time and in place to place, they
tend to have certain specific associations.”).
See Tucker, supra note 4, at 520 (arguing that flawed assumptions about “principles of
corporate law or their ensuing realities” led the Court to mistakenly conclude that
“corporate political speech is indistinguishable from individual political speech”); see also
id. at 505–06 (“[T]ax treatment including the deduction of expenses and the levels of
taxation (‘double’ for corporations), issues of criminal punishment, and the application
of the commercial speech doctrine primarily to corporate speech are but a few examples
of the unique treatment that corporations receive under the law.” (footnote omitted));
Blair, supra note 36, at 9 (“Despite the use of the phrase ‘corporate personhood’ as a
summary expression to indicate that a firm has the full package of corporate
characteristics, all four characteristics [immortality, entity persona, limited liability, and
the separation of ownership and control] actually distinguish corporations from human
persons.” (emphasis in original)).
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Much of the public backlash against Citizens United can be seen as a populist
136
rejection of the idea that corporations are merely associations of citizens.
As Thomas Joo has written in a related context:
Although the shareholder-empowerment theory points out flaws in the
status quo, it does not suggest that those flaws are fatal to the legitimacy
of corporations or the corporate governance regime; indeed, it suggests
that marginal reforms would be sufficient to make corporations fully
legitimate in conformity with the orthodox fiduciary narrative. By
proposing this solution, it could be thought of as legitimating existing
137
corporate institutions rather than challenging them.

Likewise, an honest and open debate about the role of corporate theory in
cases like Citizens United could go a long way to “legitimating existing
corporate institutions rather than challenging them” by better explaining
138
the competing theories in the legal opinions that arguably turn on them.
Put another way, at least some of the distrust of corporations evident among
citizens today might be alleviated by an open and thorough discussion of
corporate theory.

VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have tried to show that corporate theory played an
important role not only in the Supreme Court’s blockbuster Citizens United
decision, but also in the significant line of campaign finance cases leading
up to that decision. This is an important point because there is no express
discussion of corporate theory in these cases, and in fact Justice Stevens
expressly disavows any role for corporate theory in his Citizens United dissent.
This disconnect between what the Justices are saying and doing implicates
the transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of the Court. Rather than
identify, explain, and defend their chosen theory of the corporation, the
Justices ignore or deny any role for corporate theory at all. In the face of the
obvious rhetorical divide between those espousing various versions of
contractarianism and concession theory, the opinions start to look like
modern versions of Hans Christian Andersen’s “The Emperor’s New
139
Clothes.” As Lino Graglia puts it:
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See generally Citizens United Backlash Grows from Cali. to NYC Urging Congress to Overturn
Corporate Personhood, DEMOCRACY NOW (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.democracynow.org/
2012/1/5/citizens_united_backlash_grows_from_cali (describing the response of state
and local legislatures to the Citizens United decision).
Thomas W. Joo, Narrative, Myth, and Morality in Corporate Legal Theory, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1091, 1105 (2009).
Id.
HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, The Emperor’s New Clothes, in FAIRY TALES 91 (Jackie
Wullschlager ed., Tiina Nunnally trans., 2004).
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The Emperor’s tailors were clever enough to convince him that they had
made him a beautiful, though invisible, new suit of clothes. Unable to
believe, or unwilling to admit, that their Emperor had been fooled, his
loyal subjects also admired the clothes until an innocent child, heedless
of politics and propriety, pointed out that the Emperor was naked. The
Court is analogous to the Emperor’s tailors in regard to its rulings of
unconstitutionality. Although such rulings are obviously pure policy
judgments, the Court wraps them in imaginary constitutional
prohibitions, which professors of constitutional law, like the Emperor’s
loyal subjects, then claim to see, in the confident expectation that few
others will be bold or observant enough to point out that the alleged
140
prohibitions are entirely imaginary.

Perhaps the public outcry in response to the Citizens United opinion will
take on the role of the “innocent child” in the Hans Christian Andersen
fable and help spur the Court to re-examine its avoidance and denial of the
role of corporate theory in cases involving the rights and responsibilities of
141
corporations under the Constitution.
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Lino A. Graglia, Originalism and the Constitution: Does Originalism Always Provide the
Answer?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 75 (2011) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 82
(“It is only because of Justice Kennedy’s vote, that the First Amendment prohibits the
federal government from limiting political speech by a corporation.” (citing Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010))).
Cf. Steven J. André, The Transformation of Freedom of Speech: Unsnarling the Twisted Roots of
Citizens United v. FEC, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 69, 106 n.228 (2010) (“The views of the
Legal Realists notwithstanding, suffice it to say, the Court’s susceptibility to the influence
of public opinion is by now well accepted.” (citing WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., LAW AND
ATTITUDE CHANGE (1984); Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth,
How Public Opinion Constrains The Supreme Court (Nov. 5, 2008), available at
http://government.arts.cornell.edu/assets/faculty/docs/enns/Opinion_SC.pdf
(“We
argue that the public mood establishes a boundary that constrains—and thus directly
infuences—the Court’s behavior.”))).

